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Article 66 Presumption of innocence 
1. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance 
with the applicable law. 
2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused. 
3. In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
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A. Introduction/General remarks 
1 
The French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789 recognizes, at article 9, 
‘[t]out homme étant présumé innocent jusqu’à ce qu’il ait été déclaré coupable’1. The same 
principle was recognized by common law courts. A famous English judgment states that 
‘where intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus on the defendant to prove that the act 
alleged was accidental. Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is 
always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt …’2. 
2 
What is an undisputed general principle of law3 was included in Article 11(1) of the UDHR4 
and echoed in the universal and regional human rights conventions5. It imposes the burden of 
proof upon the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, a specialized application in criminal 
law of a rule that is common to all forms of litigation, namely that the plaintiff has the burden 
of proof. But the presumption of innocence may have other manifestations, for example in the 
right of an accused person to interim release pending trial, subject to exceptional 
circumstances in which preventive detention may be ordered, the right of the accused person 
to be detained separately from those who have been convicted, and the right of the accused to 
remain silent during the investigation and during trial. Several of the rules that reflect the 
presumption of innocence are incorporated within the ICC Statute, for example: during an 
investigation (Article 56), including the right ‘[t]o remain silent, without such silence being a 
consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence’; interim release (Article 59(3)–(6), 
Article 60(2)–(4)); rights of the accused at trial (Article 67, particularly (1)(g) and (i)); 
requirement of a two-thirds majority for a finding of guilt (Article 74(3)); grounds for appeal, 
which are larger for the defence than for the prosecution (Article 81(1)). Nevertheless, it was 
also felt necessary to affirm the principle generally and explicitly. 
3 
 
1 ‘Every man being presumed innocent until he has been declared guilty’. 
2 Woolmington v. D.P.P., [1935] A.C. 462, 25 Cr. App. R. 72 (J.C.P.C.), p. 481 (A.C.). 
3 Pradel, DPComparé 249–250; Bassiouni (1993) 3 DukeJComp&IL 235, 266, n. 143. 
4 GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
5 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/I.4 (1948), Art. 
XXVI; ICCPR, 999 UNTS 171, entered into force 23 Mar. 1976, Art. 14(2); ACHR 1144 UNTS 123, entered 
into force 18 July 1978, Art. 8(2); ECHR, 213 UNTS 221, entered into force 3 Sep. 1953, Art. 6(2), and on this 
provision see Triffterer (1982) ÖJZ 617 and part II 647; AfricanChHPR, OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 
entered into force 21 Oct. 1986, Art. 7(1)(b); Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 44/25, Annex, 
entered into force 2 Sep. 1990, Art. 40(2)(b)(i). 
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The provision enshrining the presumption of innocence appears in Part 6 of the Statute, 
entitled ‘The Trial’. It immediately precedes the provision concerning the rights of the 
accused at trial. In the international human rights treaties, the presumption of innocence is 
generally contained within the general provision concerning fair trial rights. This was the 
placement recommended by the ILC in its Draft Statute6. But during the drafting of the 
Statute, the PrepCom considered as an alternative the positioning of the presumption of 
innocence provision within the Part dealing with General Principles7. The WGs on general 
principles and on procedures each generated an identical text recognizing the presumption of 
innocence. The report of the Inter-Sessional meeting at Zutphen recommended that it be 
placed in Part 6 and this choice was endorsed by the PrepCom in its Final Report. 
B. Analysis and interpretation of elements 
4 
The ILC Draft Statute contained the following provision: ‘An accused shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty in accordance with law. The onus is on the Prosecutor to establish 
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt’8. The second sentence, containing the 
reference to the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard had not been included in the ILC Draft Statute 
1993. However, that earlier version was accompanied by a commentary that left no doubt 
about this issue: 
 
‘This provision recognizes that in a criminal proceeding the accused is entitled to a 
presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. The 
presumption of innocence is recognized in article 14, paragraph 2, of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that ‘Everyone charged with a criminal 
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’. 
The Prosecutor has the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
or in accordance with the standard for determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the 
Prosecutor fails to prove that the accused committed the alleged crime, then the person must 
be found not guilty of the charges contained in the indictment’9. 
 
Article 40 of the ILC Draft Statute 1994 was one of the very rare provisions on which the Ad 
Hoc Committee that met in 1995 made no comments in its report, perhaps indicating its 
uncontroversial nature10. However, the Ad Hoc Committee did insist on respect, by the court, 
 
6 ILC Draft Statute 1994, Art. 40, 114. 
7 PrepCom I 1996, para. 179, Art. T, 41. 
8 ILC Draft Statute 1994, Art. 40. See also: Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
UN Doc. A/51/332 (1996) 18 HRLJ 96, Art. 11(1): ‘An individual charged with a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty…’. The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals 
contain the following: ‘The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the provisions 
of the present Statute’: Art. 21(3) ICTY Statute; Art. 20(3) ICTR Statute. 
9 ILC Draft Statute 1993, 119. 
10 Ad Hoc Committee Report, 35. 
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of ‘the highest standards of justice, integrity and due process’, which, clearly, comprise the 
presumption of innocence11. 
5 
During the March-April 1996 session of the PrepCom, an informal group pursued work on 
general principles following the guidelines set out by the Ad Hoc Committee12, and in the 
Committee’s report to the GA in late 1996  a section was added to the Draft Statute entitled 
‘General Principles of Criminal Law’. It consisted of a series of twenty draft articles, 
including a provision dealing with the presumption of innocence: ‘An accused shall be 
presumed innocent [until] [unless] [proved guilty] [convicted] in accordance with [this 
Statute] [law]. [The onus is on the prosecutor to establish the guilt of the accused [beyond 
reasonable doubt]]’13. Two footnotes were included, indicating that the presumption of 
innocence was both a procedural and a substantive right14. The issue was also reviewed by the 
informal group on procedural matters when it met in August 1997. The group was aware of 
the work accomplished earlier in the year by the other informal group on the subject15, but at 
its August 1996 meeting it developed a new version: ‘Anyone [accused] [charged with a 
criminal offence] [suspected of committing a crime within the meaning of this statute] shall 
be presumed innocent until proved guilty [in accordance with law]. [The onus is on the 
Prosecutor to establish the guilt of the accused.] [The accused is declared guilty only when the 
majority of the TC considers that the guilt of the accused has been proved] beyond a 
reasonable doubt’16. 
6 
The Working Group (‘WG’) on General Principles met during the February 1997 session of 
the PrepCom, but it did not examine the presumption of innocence provision for lack of 
time17. At the August 1997 session of the PrepCom, the WG on Procedural Matters 
considered the presumption of innocence provision, and adopted a text that was identical to 
the ILC Draft, except that the initial words ‘[a]n accused’ were replaced with ‘[e]veryone’18. 
A footnote mentioned that the requirement that guilt be established by a majority of the Trial 
Chamber could be addressed in Article 4519. A second footnote observed that ‘[r]eservations 
were expressed regarding the phrases ‘in according with law’ and ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ contained in the ILC text’20. At the December 1997 meeting of the PrepCom, the WG 
 
11 Ibid., para. 129, 29. 
12 Preparatory Committee I 1996, see note 112. 
13 Preparatory Committee II 1996, Part 3bis, 104; also UN Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.9. 
14 Ibid., Part 3bis, 104: ‘[Note 1. The presumption of innocence is also a procedural matter.] [Note 2. 
Presumption of innocence [also] constitutes a substantive right of the accused]’. 
15 Ibid., 194, fn.*. 
16 Ibid., 194; also UN Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.14. However, there are no explanatory comments on the 
provision in the Report: Preparatory Committee I 1996, 57, see note 112. 
17 PrepCom Decisions Feb. 1997, Annex II, 18, para. 2. 
18 PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, 33; also UN Doc. A/AC.249/1997/WG.4/CRP.7. A fn. observed that 
the matter had also being considered by the informal WG on general principles of criminal law. 
19 PrepCom Decisions Aug. 1997, 33, fn. 12. 
20 Ibid., fn. 13. See also: Zutphen Draft, 113, fn. 199; PrepCom Draft 1998, 106, fn. 9. 
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on General Principles returned to the provision, and adopted a text that was identical to that of 
the WG on Procedural Matters21. 
7 
As a result, the Zutphen Draft of January 1998 contained two identical provisions on the 
presumption of innocence, one in the section dealing with general principles22, the other in the 
section dealing with trial23. The Draft opted for the section dealing with trial as the 
appropriate place within the Statute for the provision24. This is what appeared in the 
PrepCom’s final Draft, adopted in April 199825. Thus, the ILC Draft had survived essentially 
intact. 
8 
At the Rome Conference, the provision was examined by the WG on Procedural Matters, and 
there the PrepCom Draft underwent substantial modification. A working paper was submitted 
dividing the text into three distinct paragraphs, each consisting of a single sentence. Several 
words were underlined, reflecting efforts at compromise within the Committee. But this was 
obviously an unworkable solution, as the final version could not contain words that were 
underlined or italicized. The proposal read: 
 
• ‘1. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in 
accordance with the law applicable to it. 
• 2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused. 
• 3. In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused 
beyond reasonable doubt’26. 
 
Some argued that the provision should also recognize the right of the accused to raise 
defences and to present evidence. These views were reflected in a footnote, recommending 
that this be taken into account in drafting Article 67 (rights of the accused) and Article 69 
(evidence)27. 
9 
The proposed text was adopted by the WG with one minor change in the first sentence, 
removal of the word ‘the’ in the phrase ‘with the law applicable to it’. The word ‘must’ in the 
third sentence remained underlined, although all other forms of emphasis were removed in the 
 
21 PrepCom Decisions Dec. 1997, 24. 
22 Zutphen Draft, 65, Art. P. 
23 Ibid., 113, Art. 59. 
24 Ibid., p. 65. This conclusion was not shared by academic commentators, however. See: Sadat Wexler 
(1998) 13bis NEP 40–41, 99. 
25 PrepCom Draft 1998, 106, Art. 66. 
26 Proposed new text, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.37* (29 June, reissued 4 July), 1; Working 
Paper on Article 66, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.37/Corr.1 (9 July), 1. 
27 Ibid.: ‘In connection with this text, it was also suggested that the following provision should be added to 
article 67 or article 69: “The accused shall have the right to raise defences under the provisions of this Statute, 
and to present evidence in their support”’. 
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final version28. The Drafting Committee eliminated the underlining altogether, and reworked 
the final words of the first sentence so as to read ‘in accordance with the applicable law’29. 
I. Paragraph 1 
10 
Paragraph 1 consists of a general statement of the presumption of innocence. It is followed by 
two paragraphs setting out the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The ECtHR has 
defined the presumption of innocence as follows: 
 
‘It requires, inter alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court should not 
start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence charged; the 
burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should benefit the accused. It also 
follows that it is for the prosecution to inform the accused of the case that will be made 
against him, so that he may prepare and present his defence accordingly, and to adduce 
evidence sufficient to convict him’30. 
 
1. ‘Everyone’ 
11 
The original ILC Draft recognized the presumption of innocence belongs to ‘[a]n accused’ but 
this was changed to ‘[e]veryone’ by the PrepCom31. This readily suggests that the 
presumption avails to protect suspects who have not been accused as well as appellants who 
have been convicted and who are being sentenced, or whose cases are on appeal. A contrary 
conclusion is suggested, however, by the placement of the presumption of innocence within 
Part 6 of the Statute, concerning trial, and immediately prior to Article 67 dealing with the 
‘rights of the accused’. 
12 
That the presumption of innocence would apply at the investigation stage requires little 
explanation32. Its effects are less significant than at the trial stage because issues such as 
burden of proof do not arise. However, it might give rise to an obligation on the prosecution 
 
28 Report of the WG on Procedural Matters, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.2 (4 July), 4. 
Also: Compendium of draft articles referred to the Drafting Committee by the Committee of the Whole as of 
9 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.58, 41. 
29 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.88, 5. This was the version adopted by the Committee of the Whole and 
the Plenary on 17 July: UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1. 
30 ECtHR, Barberá, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, Series A, No. 146, 6 Dec. 1988, para 77. See also 
ECtHR, Kustova and Bibanin v. Russia, 44309/06 and 39973/08, 28 Jan. 2020, para. 36; SA-Capital OY v. 
Finland, 5556/10, 14 Feb. 2019, para. 107 
31 Preparatory Committee II 1996, 194. Actually, it started with ‘anyone’, but this was later changed to 
‘everyone’. 
32 See: Principle 36 (1) of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of 
Detention or Imprisonment, GA Res. 42/173: ‘A detained person suspected of or charged with a criminal offence 
shall be presumed innocent and shall be treated as such until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence’. 
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not to reveal the names of suspects or to comment on their alleged culpability until a formal 
warrant of arrest is issued by the PTC33. The presumption of innocence should also protect a 
suspect during the investigation stage by ensuring the right to silence34. This is accomplished 
by a specific provision of the Statute protecting a suspect’s right ‘[t]o remain silent, without 
such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence’ (Art. 55(2) (b)). 
The Strasbourg jurisprudence concludes, however, that the presumption of innocence may not 
be invoked to obstruct the conduct of blood and similar tests35, identity parades36 or medical 
examinations37, or to challenge an order to produce documents38. 
13 
It seems far less obvious that the presumption of innocence will apply at the sentencing stage. 
Indeed, the ECtHR has taken the view that the presumption deals with proof of guilt and that 
it is therefore inapplicable during the sentencing phase of trial, once guilt has already been 
determined39. It is difficult to conceive of how a person who has been found guilty can at the 
same time be presumed innocent. As a practical consequence, this would mean that any 
evidence considered for the purposes of establishing the appropriate sentence need not be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the Statute sets no special rule, general 
principles of law would suggest that evidence on sentencing be established on a balance of 
probabilities, with the burden to prove mitigating or aggravating factors resting on the defence 
and the prosecution respectively. 
14 
For the same reasons, it seems illogical to apply the presumption of innocence to an appeal 
taken only against the sentence. Similarly, if the appeal is taken by the prosecution against an 
acquittal, it is equally obvious that the presumption must continue to apply. To the extent that 
its principal focus is on evidentiary matters, the presumption of innocence must continue to 
benefit the convicted person on appeal. The appellate tribunal must reassess the sufficiency of 
evidence based on the same standard as the TC. Where an appellant introduces new evidence 
on appeal, if it is deemed admissible it need only raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. 
2. ‘the Court’ 
15 
 
33 ICC, Situation in Libya, PTC I, Decision on the OPCD ‘Requête relative aux propos publics de 
Monsieur le Procureur et au respect de la presomption d’innocence’, ICC-01/11-17, 8 Sept. 2011. 
34 This is the view taken by international human rights authorities. For example: Noor Muhammad, in 
Henkin,  Bill of Rights (1981) 138; Schabas, CCPR Commentary (2019) 382.  
35 ECtHR, El Khalloufi v. Netherlands,  37164/17, 26 Nov. 2019; Sršen v. Croatia (Dec.), 30305/13, 22 
Jan. 2019, para. 44. 
36 Harris et al., ECHR (2018) 460–467. 
37 ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 54810/00, 11 July 2006, para. 70. 
38 ECtHR, Funke v. France, 10828/84, 25 Feb. 1993, para. 69. 
39 ECtHR, Engel et al. v. Netherlands, 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71 and 5354/72, 8 June 1976, para. 90. On 
this decision, see: Triffterer, (1976) EuGRZ 363 and Part II (1977) EuGRZ; Stavros, Guarantees (1993) 261; 
ECtHR, Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, 7299/75 and 7496/76, 10 Feb. 1983, para. 40. See also, Schabas, 
CCPR Commentary (2019) 382.  
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The term ‘the Court’ can only mean the ICC. The presumption of innocence is an obligation 
on all organs of the Court, as indicated by decisions on the statements of prosecution 
counsel40. Outside of Court proceedings, while the Prosecutor is not obliged to remain silent 
on ongoing cases, the presumption of innocence places limits on what he or she might 
reasonably say41. An obligation to respect the presumption of innocence also attaches to the 
Registry. Before the ICTY,  a Registry spokesperson’s remark that it would be ‘shameful’ to 
deny the genocide in Bosnia was deemed ‘inappropriate’ and contrary to the presumption of 
innocence principle42. The PTC decision ordered the Registry to change a webpage of the 
Court’s website to indicate that an individual was a suspect, not an accused, prior to the 
Confirmation of Charges hearing43. 
 
3. ‘in accordance with the applicable law’ 
16 
Although some writers have suggested a degree of ambiguity associated with the terms ‘in 
accordance’44, it would seem clear enough that the reference is to the application of the law of 
the Statute to trials before the court. The term ‘applicable law’ is defined in Article 21 of the 
Statute45. It consists of a hierarchy, beginning with the Statute, EoC and the RPE. These 
sources are followed, where appropriate, by applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict. Failing that, the applicable law comprises general principles of law derived by the 
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world. The reference to applicable law 
provides the Court with the possibility of developing a form of exclusionary rule, by which 
evidence could be refused if obtained illegally, either by those acting under the authority of 
the Statute or those completely independent of it. This would enlarge its more limited power 
to exclude evidence pursuant to Article 69(7).Thus, evidence obtained illegally would not be 
evidence obtained ‘in accordance with the applicable law’ and therefore could not form the 
basis for a finding of guilt. 
17 
The presumption of innocence clearly interplays with the rights of the accused, and Article 
67(1)(i) confirms that no onus shall be placed on the accused to prove his or her innocence. 
 
40 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, TC I, Decision on the press interview with Ms Le Fraper du Hellen, ICC-
01/04-01/06-2433, 12 May 2010; ICC, Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, PTC I, Decision on Defence Request for 
an Order to Preserve the Impartiality of the Proceedings, ICC-01/04-01/10-51, 31 Jan. 2011; ICC, Prosecutor v. 
Bemba, Decision on ‘Defence Request concerning the Prosecutor’s statement in Jeune Afrique’, ICC-01/05-
01/08-3311, 8 Jan. 2016. 
41  ICC, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, AC, Decision on the Request for Disqualification of the 
Prosecutor, ICC-01/11-01/11-175, 12 Jun. 2012, para. 27. 
42 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Popović, Transcript, IT-05-88-T, 26 March 2007. 
43 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30, 9 Nov. 2006. 
44 Blakesley (1998) 13bis NEP 69, 87. 
45 A possible argument that the term as used in Art. 66 should not be confined to the technical meaning 
given in Art. 21, but rather receive some broader construction, could rely on the fact that Art. 31(3), which 
contains the only other reference in the Statute to ‘applicable law’, reads ‘applicable law as set forth in Art. 21’. 
A contrario, where there is no reference to Art. 21, the term is not subject to the statutory definition. 
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The presumption also intersects with such issues as the right to provisional release and the 
right to silence. In the Ruto case, it was noted that the accused’s request to be continually 
absent from trial had to be assessed in light of the presumption of innocence: 
 
‘In the circumstances of the present litigation, to have ‘full respect for the rights of the 
accused’ will necessarily begin with giving the minimum of a reasonable accommodation to 
the presumption of innocence that the accused enjoys under Article 66(1) of the Statute — 
also accepted as a ‘right’ under international human rights law, as noted earlier. To give it full 
effect in the circumstances now under consideration will require the Chamber to take the path 
of construction that will accommodate the natural incidence of that right, in a manner that is 
not unduly inconvenient to the overall purpose’46. 
 
II. Paragraph 2: Onus of proof 
18 
Evidentiary issues are central to the presumption of innocence47. That the prosecutor has the 
burden of proof would seem to be a general principle of law48. It is a burden that never 
shifts.49 That being said, the Court has noted its own ‘truth-finding’ role, meaning that it is not 
solely reliant on the consent of the parties to request all of the evidence necessary to reach its 
findings. Pursuant to Article 69(3) of the Statute, ‘the Court has the authority to request the 
submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth’.50 
According to the AC, ‘The fact that the onus lies on the Prosecutor cannot be read to exclude 
the statutory powers of the court, as it is the court that must be convinced of the guilt of the 
accused beyond reasonable doubt.’51 Although the onus is on the prosecution to prove the 
guilt of the accused, participating victims have been granted permission to introduce 
incriminating evidence.52 There may be issues with this approach, in so far as victims do not 
share the same disclosure obligations as the Prosecutor has under Article 67(2) of the Statute 
and Rules 76 to 84. However, it has been stressed that a Chamber will only authorise the 
 
46 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto, TC V, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence 
at Trial, ICC-01/09-01/11-777, 18 June 2013, para. 48. 
47 Preparatory Committee I 1996, see fn. 8, para. 286,  60. 
48 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 599. See also the 
remarks of Judge Claude Jorda, presiding over PTC I, in ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Transcript, ICC-01/04-
01/06-T-30, 9 Nov. 2006, p. 11. 
49  ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo et al., TC I, Reasons for Oral Decision of of 15 January 2019 on the 
Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu'un jugement d'acquittement portant sur toutes les charges soit 
prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en liberté immédiate soit ordonnée, Reasons of Judge 
Geoffrey Henderson, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263-AnxB, 16 July 2019, para. 15. 
50 See generally, Heinze, Disclosure (2014), 218–223, 243–250, 499–505. 
51 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, AC, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against 
Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 Jan. 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, 11 July 2008, 
para. 95. 
52 Ibid., para. 112; ICC, Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, TC II, Decision on the Modalities of 
Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788, 22 Jan. 2010, para. 82. 
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introduction of such evidence if it will not prejudice the fairness and impartiality of the trial 
and the rights of the accused.53 
19 
The presumption of innocence may be breached where an accused person is required to 
produce evidence to counter the charge even in the absence of any direct evidence of guilt. 
Although an exceptional measure, most legal systems, even those that purport to adhere 
scrupulously to the presumption of innocence, allow for some exceptions of this sort. The 
least offensive of such provisions are so-called factual presumptions, where proof of one fact 
is deemed by the court to constitute proof of another, incriminating fact. An example would 
be the presumption that a person who is in possession of recently stolen goods is in fact the 
thief. The prosecution need only establish two facts, that the object was stolen, and that it was 
in the possession of the accused. In order to avoid conviction for theft (and not just possession 
of stolen goods), the accused must then rebut the prosecution’s case by leading evidence. 
While ostensibly a violation of the presumption of innocence, this approach is defended by 
judges as nothing more than a common sense rule, a logical deduction from the facts. More 
extreme forms of reversal of the burden of proof are effected by specific legislation. A 
frequent example is the presumption that a person in possession of a substantial quantity of 
narcotic drugs is more than a simple possessor, but is actually a trafficker, or at least is in 
possession for the purposes of trafficking. Despite any direct evidence of trafficking, the 
accused is required to rebut such a presumption. This form of reversal of burden of proof is 
somewhat academic, as far as the Statute is concerned, because there are no such ‘reverse 
onus’ provisions within the crimes defined by the Statute. 
20 
Nevertheless, the drafters of the Statute were alive to the issue because they introduced, in 
Article 67(1)(i)a provision that specifically contemplates the problem of reversal of onus of 
proof: the right of an accused ‘[n]ot to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden 
of proof or any onus of rebuttal’. Although Article 67 is based essentially on existing models, 
principally Article 14(3) of the ICCPR, the reverse onus prohibition in Article 67(1)(i)is quite 
original. Again, its application is problematic, because there are no typical reverse onus 
provisions in the Statute. Thus, its application to judge-made reverse onus provisions would 
seem to be the real purpose of the provision. Depending on the scope this is given by the 
Court, these norms may create troublesome hurdles for the prosecution and provide the 
defence with a wealth of arguments. 
21 
For example, during the so-called Čelebići trial before the ICTY, one of the accused raised a 
plea of lack of mental capacity, or insanity. The TC considered that the accused was presumed 
to be sane, despite an absence of prosecution evidence, and that it was for the accused to 
establish the contrary. Not only was the accused required to lead evidence of insanity, the TC 
also held that the accused had a burden to prove this according to the preponderance of 
 
53 ICC, Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ibid., para. 84. 
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evidence standard54. As the TC explained, ‘[t]his is in accord and consistent with the general 
principle that the burden of proof of facts relating to a particular peculiar knowledge is on the 
person with such knowledge or one who raises the defence’55. Given the combined effect of 
Article 66(2) and 67(1)1 (i), would the ICC not conclude otherwise? At the very least, it 
would seem appropriate for the Court to rule that the accused is only required to raise a 
reasonable doubt as to mental condition, an approach that many legal systems have been able 
to live with56. But under a more extreme hypothesis, the Court might apply these rules so as to 
impose a burden on the prosecution to establish sanity, a result that was surely unintended by 
the drafters of the Statute and one that could wreak havoc with the work of the Prosecutor. 
22 
The provisions of the Statute dealing with command responsibility may also, although more 
indirectly, lead to problems concerning the burden of proof. According to Article 28, when 
individuals under the control of a superior commit crimes within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court, the superior is deemed responsible for such crimes if he or she 
‘should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes’. It will 
be argued that the superior is not being charged with the crime itself, but only with negligent 
supervision of troops or other subordinates. Yet negligence is not a crime within the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the Court; indeed, the core crimes require proof of the highest level of 
mens rea. The practical effect of Article 28, once proof of commission of crimes by 
subordinates has been made, is to force the accused to testify in order to rebut the presumption 
of negligence, and to establish that the superior took ‘all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution’ (Art. 28(1)(b)). Consequently, there 
is an effective reversal of the onus of proof. 
23 
The ICC Statute provides for no exceptions to the general principle of the presumption of 
innocence. By analogy, the ECHR, which also recognizes the presumption of innocence and 
without, in the text at least, any possibility of its limitation or restriction, has admitted that 
reverse onus provisions are included in all domestic systems of criminal law. They are not 
contrary to the presumption of innocence, according to the Court, unless they go beyond 
‘reasonable limits’, taking into account what is at stake and the rights of the defence57. The 
problem with transposing the European jurisprudence is that the Convention contains no 
 
54 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., TC, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, paras. 602-603, 1157–
1160. The Trial Chamber cites two English cases in support of its conclusion: R. v. Dunbar, [1958] 1 Q.B. 1; R. 
v. Grant, [1960] CLR 424. 
55 Delalić et al., TC, IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 1172. 
56 SCOTUS, Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 Dec. 1895; SCOTUS, Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 31 
March 1970; SCOTUS, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 9 Jun. 1975; SCOTUS, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307 28 Jun. 1979. But see: Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 SCR. 1303, 62 C.C.C. (3d) 
193, 20 Dec. 1990. 
57 ECtHR, Salabiaku v. France, 10519/83, 7 Oct. 1988, para. 28. Also ECtHR, Willcox and Hurford v. the 
United Kingdom, 43759/10 and 43771/12, 8 Jan. 2013, para. 96; ECtHR, Nicoleta Gheorghe v. Romania, 
23470/05, 3 April 2012, para. 30. 
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clause similar to Article 67(1)(i), that explicitly rules out such exceptions to the presumption 
of innocence. 
III. Paragraph 3: Reasonable doubt 
24 
Human rights law has left the issue of the standard of proof in criminal law in an uncertain 
state. The ECtHR has no clear pronouncement on the subject58. An amendment specifying the 
‘reasonable doubt’ standard of proof was defeated during the drafting of Article 14 of the 
ICCPR59. However, the HRC has been less circumspect, clarifying that the prosecution must 
establish proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt60. Citing authority from the post WWII  
tribunals, May and Wierda have said that if ‘from credible evidence two reasonable inferences 
may be drawn, one of guilt and the other of innocence, the latter must be taken’. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt means that the accused’s guilt must be proven to a moral certainty61. In 
Pohl, the U.S. Military Tribunal said: ‘It is such a doubt as, after full consideration of all the 
evidence, would leave an unbiased, reflective person charged with the responsibility of 
decision, in such a state of mind that he could not say that he felt an abiding conviction 
amounting to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge’62. The IMT at Nuremberg applied 
the standard of reasonable doubt, stating explicitly in its judgment that Schacht and von Papen 
were to be acquitted because of failure to meet that burden of proof63. 
As for the ad hoc Tribunals, they seem to have had no difficulty with the issue, and there are 
frequent statements in their initial judgments to the effect that the reasonable doubt standard 
applies64. In the Čelebići case, the TC said that ‘the Prosecution is bound in law to prove the 
case alleged against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. At the conclusion of the case the 
accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether the offence has been proved’65. An 
ICTY TC was found to have misapplied the test of ‘reasonable doubt’ when it entertained the 
remote possibility that five men killed in Jaskici might have been victims of a large force of 
Serb soldiers rather than the smaller group with which Tadić was associated. But the AC 
resisted the invitation, from the Prosecutor, to further define the scope of the term ‘reasonable 
 
58 See, ECommHumRts, Austria v. Italy, 788/60, 11 Jan. 1961, 784. 
59 UN Doc. E/CN.4/365, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.156. 
60 General Comment 13/21, UN Doc. A/39/40, 143–147, para. 7. 
61 May and Wierda (1999) 37 ColumbiaJTransnat’lL 754, citing: U.S. Military Tribunal, United States v. 
Flick et al., (1948) 6 TWC 1, 1188; U.S. Military Tribunal, United States v. Brandt et al., (1948) 2 TWC 1, 184; 
U.S. Military Tribunal, United States v. von Weizsaecker et al. (1948) 14 TWC 1, 315. 
62 U.S. Military Tribunal, United States v. Pohl et al., (1948) 5 TWC 1, 965. 
63 IMT, France et al. v. Göring et al., (1946) 22 IMT 203, 13 ILR 203, 41 AJIL 302, 318. 
64 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, TC, Judgment, IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997, paras. 234–237, 241–242, 261, 279, 
302–303, 316, 341, 369–370, 373–375, 387–388, 397, 426, 435, 448, 451–452, 455, 461, 477, 673, 693, 718, 
720–721, 726, 730, 732, 734–735, 737–738, 740, 742, 744, 746, 750, 754, 756–757, 760–761, 763–764; ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, AC, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sep. 1998, containing more than ninety references to the 
reasonable doubt standard; Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, paras. 43, 599–600, 603, 622–623, 720, 
745, 796, 810, 872, 876, 885, 896, 898, 949, 988, 1008, 1034. 
65 Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 601. 
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doubt’66. In a contempt of court proceeding, an ICTY TC concluded that although testimony 
‘raised grave suspicions’ about the contact of a lawyer, ‘[n]ot even the gravest of suspicions 
can establish proof beyond reasonable doubt…’67. 
A burden of proof of reasonable doubt contrasts with the standard imposed by Article 61(7) of 
‘substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged’. PTC I 
said this imposes a requirement that ‘charges suffisamment sérieuses ont été présentées et 
sans se limiter à de simples supputations ou soupcons’68. It went on to speak of ‘éléments de 
preuve concrets et tangibles, montrant une direction claire dans le raisonnement supportant 
ses allégations spécifiques’69. Obviously, the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is 
considerably more demanding, as the AC has noted70. Other evidentiary standards set out in 
the Statute include that of ‘grounds to believe’, found in Article 55(2), and ‘reasonable 
grounds to believe’, set out in Article 58(1)(a). These are less demanding than the ‘substantial 
grounds’ required at the confirmation hearing in accordance with Article 61(7)71. Despite the 
fact that ‘no case to answer’ proceedings were not explicitly envisioned in the ICC Statute, 
the Court has ruled that this procedural stage requires a consideration of ‘whether there is 
evidence on which a reasonable TC could convict.’72 Judge Henderson noted that it would be 
incompatible with the presumption of innocence to proceed with a trial where all of the 
prosecution evidence has been presented and that evidence is incapable of supporting a 
conviction.73  
Many evidentiary issues before the Court require only that certain facts be established on a 
balance of probabilities, or a preponderance of evidence.74 The ICTY AC has described this 
 
66 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, 181–183. For the proposals of the 
Prosecutor, see para. 174. 
67 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić et al., TC, Judgment in the Matter of Contempt Allegations Against an 
Accused and his Counsel, IT-95-9-R77, 30 June 2000. 
68 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, PTC I, Décision sur la confirmation des charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-465, 
29 Jan. 2007, para. 37. 
69 Ibid., para. 39. 
70 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, AC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the Decision of Pre- 
Trial Chamber I Entitled ‘Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict 
Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81 (2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, ICC-01/04-01/06-568, 
13 Oct. 2006, para. 56. 
71 ICC, Situation in DRC, PTC I, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101, 17 Jan. 2006, para. 98. 
72  ICC, Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang, TC V, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings 
(Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), ICC-01/09-01/11-1334, 3 June 2014, para. 32 
(emphasis in original).  
73  ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo et al., TC I, Reasons for Oral Decision of of 15 January 2019 on the 
Requête de la Défense de Laurent Gbagbo afin qu'un jugement d'acquittement portant sur toutes les charges soit 
prononcé en faveur de Laurent Gbagbo et que sa mise en liberté immédiate soit ordonnée, Reasons of Judge 
Geoffrey Henderson, ICC-02/11-01/15-1263, 16 Jul. 2019, para. 14. Cf. Ibid., Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 
para. 65 (arguing that no case to answer proceedings ‘have no place in the statutory framework of the Court and 
are unnecessary as a tool to preserve the interests and rights they are meant to serve’, and that the requisite 
standard of proof is that of beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Art. 66(3)). 
74  ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, TC I, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to 
reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 Aug. 2012, para. 253. 
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as ‘satisfaction that, more probably than not, what is asserted is true’75. It has also been 
described as an ‘onus of persuasion’76 or an ‘onus of establishing’77. Generally, it should be 
presumed that the balance of probabilities standard applies to issues of evidence other than 
those facts that are material to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence,78 unless there is 
some special provision. 
25 
Some academics have expressed concern about the meaning that might be given to the Court 
by the term ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’79. They have urged that the Statute clarify, perhaps in 
an Annex, the fact that the term means ‘conviction should not occur unless all reasonable 
hypotheses based on the evidence presented indicate guilt’. However, the precise reference to 
the standard of proof should dispel any equivocation on the subject. No further clarification 
about the burden of proof is provided in the RPE. Indeed, they are striking in the fact that they 
make no reference whatsoever to ‘burden’, ‘onus’ or ‘reasonable doubt’. Nonetheless, the 
Court’s interpretation of ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ has given rise to some criticism. 
The prosecution in Ngudjolo alleged that the approach taken in acquitting the accused was 
flawed, because the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard ‘does not require that the Chamber 
search for and then reject all hypothetically possible contrary inferences’.80 On the other hand, 
Judge van den Wyngaert in her dissent to the Katanga judgment stated that ‘It is … my firm 
belief that another reasonable reading of the evidence is possible in this case.’81 This debate 
seems to centre on whether the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt necessitates the 
exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis that can be drawn from the evidence.82 In the 
Ngudjolo Appeals Judgment, the AC found no error in the TC’s means of assessing the 
facts,83 although Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser issued a dissenting opinion where they 
criticised the TC’s ‘fragmentary’ approach to factual findings.84 In Bemba et al, the TC 
appeared to endorse an ‘exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis’ approach, finding 
that ‘When the Chamber concludes that, based on the evidence, there is only one reasonable 
 
75 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., AC, Decision on Review of Registrar’s Decision to Withdraw Legal 
Aid from Zoran Žigić, IT-98-30/1-A, 7 Feb. 2003, para. 17. 
76 Ibid., para. 14. 
77 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., AC, Judgment, IT-96-21-A, 20 Feb. 2001, para. 590. 
78  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al, PTC II,  Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989, 19 Oct. 2016, para. 186; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, AC, Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121, 1 Dec. 2014, para. 22. 
79 Blakesley (1998) 13bis NEP 69, 87. 
80 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, AC, Prosecution’s Document in Support of Appeal against the 
‘Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut’, ICC-01/04-02/12-39-Red2, 3 Apr. 2013. 
81 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, TC II, Judgment, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine van den Wyngaert, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, 7 March 2014, para. 134. 
82 Klamberg, Evidence (2013) 3. 
83 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, AC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II entitled ‘Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-01/04-02/12-271, 7 April 2015. 
84 ICC, Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, ibid., Joint DissOp of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova and Judge Cuno 
Tarfusser, para 41; see further, McDermott (2015) 13 JICJ 507. 
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conclusion to be drawn from the facts sub judice, the conclusion is that they have been 
established beyond reasonable doubt.’85 
In Bemba, the AC considered the role of appellate deference to the factual findings of a TC.86 
The principle is well-established that an AC should not interfere lightly with the factual 
findings of a TC just because it would have come to a different conclusion, given that the TC 
has had the opportunity to observe witness testimony first-hand.87 The ad hoc tribunals 
consistently held that a finding of fact could only be overturned when it is one that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have reached based on the evidence before it.88 Yet, the Majority 
held that the margin of deference should be approached with ‘extreme caution’,89 and that the 
AC ‘must be satisfied that factual findings that are made beyond reasonable doubt are clear 
and unassailable, both in terms of evidence and rationale’.90  
26 
Common law judges have devoted considerable effort to defining the notion of reasonable 
doubt, generally in an attempt to provide clear instructions for lay jurors. This is surely less 
important for experienced judges such as those likely to be elected to the Court. In Delalić the 
TC of the ICTY adopted a common-law definition: 
 
‘A reasonable doubt is a doubt which the particular jury entertain in the circumstances. 
Jurymen themselves set the standard of what is reasonable in the circumstances. It is that 
ability which is attributed to them which is one of the virtues of our mode of trial: to their task 
of deciding facts they bring to bear their experience and judgment’91. 
 
But the Court’s judges are not lay jurors, and the reference of the Tribunal in Čelebići is 
puzzling. Simply put, ‘reasonable doubt’ means a doubt that is founded in reason. It does not 
mean ‘any doubt’, ‘beyond a shadow of a doubt’, ‘absolute certainty’ or ‘moral certainty’92. 
Nor, on the other end of the scale, does it imply ‘an actual substantive doubt’ or ‘such doubt 
 
85  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al, PTC II, Public Redacted Version of Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-1989, 19 Oct. 2016, para. 188.  
86  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636, 8 June 2018, paras. 38-
46. 
87  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, AC, Judgment, IT-95-14-1/A, 24 Mar. 2000, para. 63; ICTR, 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, AC, Judgment, ICTR-96-3-A, 26 May 2003, para. 21. 
88  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, AC, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 Jul. 1999, para. 64; ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu, AC, Appeal Judgment, ICTR-96-4-A, 1 Jun. 2001, para. 178.  
89  ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial 
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636, 8 Jun. 2018, para. 38. 
90  Ibid., para. 45. See also ibid., Separate Opinion of Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison, para. 14; 
Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, paras. 42-52. Cf. Ibid., DissOp of Judges Monageng and 
Hofmanski, paras. 2-18.  
91 Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998, para. 600; citing Green v. R., (1972) 46 ALJR 545. 
92 SCOTUS, Victor v. Nebraska, 127 L.Ed.2 d 583, 22 March 1994. 
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as would give rise to a grave uncertainty’93. Courts have, but rarely, endorsed other attempts 
to explain the notion of reasonable doubt: ‘feel sure and satisfied’94; ‘honest and fair doubt … 
a doubt based upon reason and common sense’95. However, as a general rule, they have 
warned against attempts to rephrase the standard. According to Lord Goddard: ‘By using the 
words ‘reasonable doubt’ and trying to explain what is reasonable doubt and what is not, 
judges are more likely to confuse juries than if they told them in plain language: ‘It is the duty 
of the prosecution to satisfy you of the man’s guilt’’96. Similarly, according to Lord Lawton, 
‘… if judges stopped trying to define that which is almost impossible to define there would be 
fewer appeals’97. 
C. Special remarks 
I. Non-respect by other bodies 
27 
In its General Comment on Article 14 ICCPR, the HRC has insisted that the presumption of 
innocence imposes a duty on all public authorities to ‘refrain from prejudging the outcome of 
a trial’98. According to the ECommHumRts, 
 
‘It is a fundamental principle embodied in [the presumption of innocence] which protects 
everybody against being treated by public officials as being guilty of an offence before this is 
established according to law by a competent court. Article 6, paragraph 2, therefore, may be 
violated by public officials if they declare that somebody is responsible for criminal acts 
without a court having found so. This does not mean, of course, that the authorities may not 
inform the public about criminal investigations. They do not violate article 6, paragraph 2, if 
they state that a suspicion exists, that people have been arrested, that they have confessed, etc. 
What is excluded, however, is a formal declaration that somebody is guilty’99. 
 
28 
 
93 SCOTUS, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 13 Nov. 1990); SCOTUS, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 
2078, 1 Jun.1993. 
94 Ferguson v. The Queen, [1979] 1 All E.R. 877, 882 (P.C.); Regina v. Allan, [1969] 1 All.E.R. 91, 92. 
95 Regina v. Tuckey, Baynham and Walsh, (1985) 20 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (Ont. C.A.). 
96 R. v. Kritz, [1949] 2 All E.R. 406, 410. 
97 R. v. Yap Chuan Ching, (1976) 63 Cr.App.R. 7, 11. See also: Miks v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 
(1880). 
98 HRC, Cedeño v. Venezuela, No. 1940/2010, CCPR/C/106/DR/1940/2010, 17 Oct. 2012, para. 7.4; 
HRC, Kovaleva v. Belarus, No. 2120/2011, CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011, 29 Oct. 2012, para. 11.4. Also: General 
Comment 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 
30. 
99 ECtHR, Krause v. Switzerland,7986/77, 3 Oct. 1978. Also, from the Court: ECtHR, Allenet de 
Ribemont v. France, 15175/89, 10 Feb. 1995, paras. 37, 41; ECtHR, Rywin v. Poland, 6091/06, 4047/07 and 
4070/07, 18 Feb. 2016, para. 203; ECtHR, Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia, 9043/05, 25 Jun. 2013, para. 
103; ECtHR, Paulikas v. Lithuania, 57435/09, 24 Jan. 2017, para. 38. See further Rainey et al., ECHR (2017) 
289.  
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The transposition of these notions, which are related to domestic prosecutions, to the 
international context, leads to some interesting observations. The ‘authorities’ on the 
international scene will be such bodies as the HRCounc, the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, the SC, the GA and the SG. If, for example, the GA declares that genocide has been 
committed by the leaders of a given regime, can they invoke this essentially political 
accusation before the ICC in claiming that the presumption of innocence has been denied100? 
The answer, of course, is that there may well be a denial of the presumption of innocence but 
that it has not been committed by the Court itself. Nevertheless, the Court may find itself 
required to adopt innovative solutions in cases where a violation of the presumption of 
innocence by a body that is not subordinate to or subject to the control of the Court has the 
effect of compromising the right to a fair trial. 
II. Majority or unanimity? 
29 
Arguably, the presumption of innocence may require that decisions by the Court, particularly 
given the seriousness of the charges and of the available sentences, be unanimous. Certainly 
where questions of fact are at issue, is it not logical to conclude that where one member of the 
Court has a reasonable doubt, this should be enough to create a reasonable doubt in the minds 
of the tribunal as a whole101? Compelling as the suggestion may be – and it was argued by 
some delegates at the Rome Conf. – the Statute provides clearly that in case of division, a 
majority of the Court will suffice for a finding of guilt (Article 74(3)). 
III. Judicial notice 
30 
Article 67(6) authorises the Court to take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge. In 
some cases, this has gone beyond banal facts whose proof merely consumes valuable judicial 
time, and has involved judicial notice of issues lying at the core of the prosecution. For 
example, the ICTR has taken judicial notice of the fact that genocide took place in Rwanda 
during 1994102. By the admission of evidence in this manner, some have argued that this 
creates an evidentiary presumption and requires the defendant to disprove facts, thereby 
raising issues of compliance with the presumption of innocence. There is some controversy 
about the legal consequences of judicial notice. Some judgments of international tribunals 
suggest that it creates a well-founded presumption that the fact in question is accurate, and 
 
100 For example, in a resolution denouncing the atrocities in Srebrenica, SC Res.1034 (1995), the SC 
singled out for special mention the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, noting that they 
had been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for their responsibilities in the massacre. The word 
‘alleged’ did not accompany the reference to their responsibilities. The resolution ‘[c]ondemn[ed] in particular in 
the strongest possible terms the violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights by Bosnian 
Serb and paramilitary forces in the areas of Srebrenica …’. The High Representative for implementation of the 
Dayton Agreement, Carlos Westendorp, declared that the situation in Bosnia could not be ‘normalized’ until 
Karadžić was brought before the International Tribunal; such a statement could hardly be made if he was truly 
presumed innocent (press briefing of 27 July 1998). 
101 For such a suggestion, see Pruitt (1997) 10 LeidenJIL 557. 
102 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., AC, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision 
on Judicial Notice, ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), 16 June 2006. 
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that it does not have to be proven again at trial, although subject to that presumption it may 
still be challenged at that trial103. Judge Hunt of the AC of the ICTY disagreed with this 
proposition, saying that it was inappropriate to impose a reputable presumption in favour of 
the Prosecutor. This necessarily placed a burden of proof upon the accused, something that is 
contrary to the presumption of innocence, he said104. Judge Shahabuddeen disagreed, noting 
that a distinction should be made between facilitating proof and dispensing with proof: 
 
‘It is not said that the accused must prove his innocence; the position still is that the 
prosecution must prove guilt. All that the law does is that it facilitates proof by allowing a 
party to adduce required evidence in a certain way. What is the value of that evidence is then 
a matter for the parties in the ordinary way. In establishing the value of the evidence – 
including evidence given by judicial notice being taken of adjudicated facts – the accused is 
entitled to a right of rebuttal’105. 
 
The AC of the SCSL took the position that once judicial notice has been taken of a fact, the 
evidentiary inquiry is concluded and the fact cannot be contested106. Judge Robertson 
explained that facts judicially noticed must be ‘invincible’, because otherwise, ‘the doctrine 
would serve little purpose’107. 
IV. Evidence of similar conduct 
31 
The RPE make no special provision for admissibility of evidence for the purpose of showing a 
consistent pattern of conduct relevant to serious violations of IHL. The Rules of the three UN 
international criminal tribunals allow such evidence in the interests of justice108. This may 
threaten the presumption of innocence of the accused, in that evidence of crimes not alleged 
in the indictment is used to establish guilt for the acts on which the prosecution is based. It is 
not to be confused with evidence of good character, which the defence may choose to present 
in an appropriate case109. The AC of the ICTY has noted ‘under the so-called principle of 
 
103 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, AC, Decision on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal Against the 
Trial Chamber’s 10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, IT-02-
54-AR73.5, 28 Oct. 2003; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, TC, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial 
Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Admission of Written Statements of Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92bis, IT-00-
39&40, 28 Feb. 2003, para. 15. 
104 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, AC, DissOp of Judge David Hunt, IT-02-54-AR73.5, 28 Oct. 2003. 
105 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milošević, AC, SepOp of Judge Shahabuddeen Appended to the Appeals 
Chamber’s Decision dated 28 October 2003 on the Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal against the Trial 
Chamber’s 10 April 2003 Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, IT-02-54-
AR73.5, 28 Oct. 2003. 
106 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Norman et al., AC, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against ‘Decision on 
Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence’, SCSL-04-14-AR73, 16 May 2005, 
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‘similar fact evidence’, courts in England and Wales, Australia and the U.S. admit evidence of 
crimes or wrongful acts committed by the defendant other than those charged in the 
indictment, if the other crimes are introduced to demonstrate a special knowledge, 
opportunity, or identification of the defendant that would make it more likely that he 
committed the instant crime as well’110. For example, evidence of various sniping incidents 
for which the accused, Galić, was alleged to be responsible was presented in evidence in order 
to establish a consistent pattern of conduct111. Testimony by a woman who had been 
victimised by Mlado Radić was also admitted on this basis, although the acts were not 
mentioned in the indictment.112 In the same case, similar fact evidence was also admitted 
against Zoran Žigić113. The ICTY AC admitted evidence that Drago Josipović had 
participated in an attack of the same nature, in the same vicinity and during the same time 
period as the acts charged, in order to establish a pattern indicating guilt for the attack in 
Ahmici on 16 April 1993114. Because there is no provision on similar fact evidence in the 
Statute and in the RPE of the ICC, its judges will have to decide in specific cases whether or 
not such evidence is admissible. In so doing, they need to consider the tension this may create 
with the presumption of innocence. 
V. Provisional release 
32 
Much of the discussion about the presumption of innocence in the case law of international 
criminal tribunals has concerned applications for provisional release. Article 9(3) ICCPR, in 
what is said to be a corollary of the presumption of innocence, states that ‘[i]t shall not be the 
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody’. In an early decision of 
the ICTY, President Cassese said he was striking a balance between two main interests, 
namely ‘the right of all detainees to be treated in a human manner in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of respect for their inherent dignity and the presumption of innocence’ 
and the imperatives of security and order115. In a later debate, following the amendment of the 
RPE to remove the ‘exceptional circumstances’ condition for provisional release (Rule 65(b) 
ICTY RPE), Judge Robinson said that ‘[w]hile the Tribunal’s lack of a police force, its 
inability to execute its arrest warrants in States and its corresponding reliance on States for 
such execution may be relevant in considering an application for provisional release, on no 
account can that feature of the Tribunal’s regime justify either imposing a burden on the 
accused in respect of an application under Rule 65 or rendering more substantial such a 
burden, or warranting a detention of the accused for a period longer than would be justified 
having regard to the requirement of public interest, the presumption of innocence and the rule 
of respect for individual liberty’. He said it was a norm of customary international law, based 
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on the presumption of innocence, ‘to make pre-trial detention an exception, which is only 
permissible in special circumstances’116. Another judge said that ‘as a general rule, a decision 
to release an accused should be based on an assessment of whether public interest 
requirements, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweigh the need to ensure, for 
an accused, respect for the right to liberty of person’117. 
The AC of the SCSL took a substantially different position, rejecting any relevance of the 
presumption of innocence to the determination of provisional release. ‘Whether a defendant 
will turn up for trial or intimidate witnesses cannot logically be affected by the burden or 
standard of proof that will prevail at his trial, nor by presuming him innocent or guilty of the 
offences charged (since innocent defendants may nevertheless try to avoid a lengthy trial or to 
threaten those who have made statements against them)’118. The AC cited a ruling of the 
SCOTUS in this respect: ‘[T]he presumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the 
burden of proof in criminal trials… [b]ut it has no application to a determination of the rights 
of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun’119. 
33 
The first decisions of the ICC concerning provisional release made no reference to the 
presumption of innocence120. By 2010, however, the Court had noted that ‘[t]his procedural 
safeguard must also be seen in the context of the detained person’s right to be presumed 
innocent’121, and this approach has been followed in later rulings.122 In Gbagbo, the TC said 
the fact that the accused denied any responsibility for the crimes with which he was charged 
was considered as a factor favouring his continued detention.123 The AC reversed this 
decision, finding that  ‘no one should be forced to accept responsibility in order to achieve 
interim release.’124 
 
 
116 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krajisnik et al., TC III,  Decision on Momcilo Krajisnik’s Notice of Motion for 
Provisional Release, IT-00-39 & 40-PT, 8 Oct. 2001, DissOp of Judge Patrick Robinson. 
117 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jokić et al., TC I, Orders on Motions for Provisional Release, IT-01-42-PT and IT-
01-46-PT, 20 Feb. 2002. 
118 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Norman et al., AC, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail, SCSL-04-
14-AR65, 11 March 2005, para. 37. 
119 SCOTUS, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 US 520, 533, 14 May 1979. 
120 ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo’, ICC-01/04-01/06-824, 13 Feb. 2007; ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, PTC, Decision on the 
Application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-586, 18 Oct. 2006. 
121 ICC, Prosecutor v. Bemba, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the 
decision of Trial Chamber III of 28 July 2010 entitled ‘Decision on the review of the detention of Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, ICC-01/05-01/08-1019, 
24 Nov. 2010, para. 49. 
122 See, for example, ICC, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, AC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Bosco Ntaganda 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 18 November 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the Defence’s 
Application for Interim Release’, DissOp of Judge Anita Ušacka, ICC-01/04-02/06-271, 5 March 2014, para. 4. 
123  ICC, Prosecutor v. Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, AC, Scheduling Order for the judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Laurent Gbagbo against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 10 March 2017 entitled ‘Decision on Mr Gbagbo’s 
Detention’, ICC-02/11-01/15-989, 14 July 2017, para. 17.  
124  Ibid., para. 68. 
